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The issue of informality represents one of the major challenges in the fight against poverty (Heintz, 
2009; Lautier, 2004). The traditional response has often been to apply Western entrepreneurial 
rationality to informal actors and look upon their small-scale productive units as pre-capitalist firms, 
whose growth potential supposedly depends on the provision of adequate tools such as funding and 
training (Lautier, 2004). Do informal initiatives actually share the capitalist spirit of entrepreneurship? 
This is the question we propose to answer here.  
 
Using a so called "popular economy” analytical framework, we focus on the socio-economic 
operating rationale intrinsic to informal initiatives to find out whether their logics can be assimilated 
to those of the traditional capitalist firm. Characteristically, this approach sets out from the fact that 
the specific living contexts of informal actors shape their socio-economic practices and therefor are 
crucial to an understanding of their mode of operation (Fonteneau et al., 1999). Our analysis 
concentrates on the collective/associative forms of the informal economy, the so-called “popular 
economy organizations” (Razeto, 1990; Nyssens, 1997) as these can more appropriately be 
compared with capitalist firms than individual or household-based initiatives. What follows specifically 
concerns Chile, a pioneering developer of the popular economy movement in South America. 
 
Section 2 outlines the historical context of the study, namely the economic and political evolutions in 
Chile since the 1970s and their effects on the popular economy. This background clarifies our 
empirical findings and puts them into perspective. Section 3 presents the methodology used for our 
field research conducted in Santiago de Chile from March to June 2012. Section 4 analyses the 
collected data with the view of answering our initial question.  On the grounds of these observations, 
section 5 reassesses the theoretical discourse of the 1980s and early 1990s on Chile's popular 
economy organizations. Section 6 puts forth our conclusions. 
 
2. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE EVOLUTION OF THE POPULAR 
ECONOMY IN CHILE SINCE THE 1970S 
 
(a) Macroeconomic and political evolutions since 1973 
 
The 1973 coup d’état, during which the armed forces led by Augusto Pinochet took power, put a 
definitive end to the socialist project of Allende’s government. Alongside violent political repression, 
the junta adopted a radical neoliberal economic policy inspired by the Chicago school–spearheaded 
inter alia by Milton Friedman (Ffrench-Davis, 2008). 
 
Advocates of neoliberalism often see non-state intervention as one of the model’s hallmarks1. In 
Chile, this became the ideological justification for the various economic reforms carried out during 
the dictatorship. As this sought to turn an import-substituting, regulated, statist economy into a free-
market system, these reforms consisted of three key features:  
1. State reforms. First of all, companies and properties expropriated by Allende’s government 
according to irregular procedures were restored to their former owners. Thus in 1974, 257 
companies and about 3,700 agrarian estates returned to the private sector while traditional 
public companies were privatized. As a result of these privatization and reprivatization 
processes, the number of state-owned companies and banks fell from over 400 in 1973 to 45 
                                           
1 It has been abundantly documented, however, that contrary to this anti-interventionist discourse, a neoliberal 
regime, both for its establishment and survival, relies on massive state intervention (Harvey, 2005). We refer to 
Karl Polanyi, who takes the view that the economic sphere and market exchanges are embedded in their social, 
political and cultural context. Accordingly, conceiving of economic activities regardless of their context is 
ideological. 
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in 1980 (Meller, 2007). A second set of reforms concerned cuts in public spending, especially 
in state social welfare and redistributive programs. The weight of public expenditures in the 
economy fell from 20% of GDP in 1971-72 to 15% in 1975 and to 12% in 1981. Fiscal 
reforms were introduced to eliminate the fiscal deficit in the context of a drastic program of 
anti-inflationary stabilization. Finally, the military regime decentralized government 
administration by transferring “significant administrative responsibilities to lower levels of 
government while further centralizing political power and control over resources” (Posner, 
2004, p. 62). 
 
2. Liberalization and deregulation of the economy. Pinochet’s regime encouraged the 
flexibilization of the labor market, which implied the weakening of unions and workers’ 
atomization. Prices were liberalized: out of 33 controlled prices in 1974 there remained less 
than 10 in 1976. The junta also proceeded to the liberalization of the national financial 
market, followed by capital account liberalization in 1979 and 1980.  
 
3. Integration of the national economy to the international economic space. This process 
consisted, first of all, in trade liberalization, which resulted in a significant increase in Chilean 
exports: from US$ 1,309 m in 1973 to US$ 3,835 m in 1979 (see table 1). As to imports, 
Chile evolved throughout the 1970s from a complex tariff and non-tariff structure–with an 
average duty of 94%–toward the establishment of a uniform 10% tariff and the elimination of 
all non-tariff barriers (Meller, 1992). After exhibiting a moderate growth rate between 1974 
and 1976 and a drastic decline in 1975 linked to Chile's economic recession that year, 
imports increased substantially after 1976, accompanied by an unrestricted opening to 
foreign investment2. 
  
                                           
2 Chile's development model adopted from 1974 onwards emblematically illustrates the current which Peemans 
calls “extraverted authoritarian modernization” (2002); this characteristically combines an authoritarian state 
and a national economy integrated into the international community through an opening to international 
markets and the development of international trade.  
 
 
Interuniversity Attraction Pole (IAP) on social enterprise (SOCENT) – 2012-2017 
www.iap-socent.be 
Table 1. Evolution of Chilean imports and exports, 1970-90. 
 
Year Imports FOB Exports FOB Annual growth rate (%) 
 
 
(millions of current 
dollars) 
 Imports Exports 
1970 956a 1.112 0,9 2,1 
1971 1.015a 999 8,5 0,8 
1972 1.103a 849 3,2 -15,1 
1973 1.288 1.309 -5,4 2,8 
1974 1.794 2.151 3,4 45,9 
1975 1.520 1.590 -38,7 2,4 
1976 1.479 2.116 4,3 24,4 
1977 2.151 2.185 35,5 11,9 
1978 2.886 2.460 17,6 11,2 
1979 4.190 3.835 22,7 14,1 
1980 5.649 4.705 18,7 14,3 
1981 6.513 3.836 15,7 -9,0 
1982 3.643 3.706 -36,3 4,7 
1983 2.845 3.831 -15,1 0,6 
1984 3.288 3.651 16,5 6,8 
1985 2.955 3.804 -11,0 6,9 
1986 3.099 4.199 9,7 9,8 
1987 3.994 5.223 17,0 8,8 
1988 4.833 7.052 12,1 6,1 
1989 6.502 8.080 25,3 15,7 
1990 7.065 8.310 0,6 7,6 
a: these are imports CIF.  
Source: Meller (1992). 
 
From an economic viewpoint, the dictatorial era is generally divided into two periods (Ffrench-Davis, 
2008; Silva, 1995). The first one (1973-1981) corresponds to the application of the aforementioned 
reforms and thus offers the purest example of neoliberal orthodoxy. As for the second period (1982-
1990), although the general paradigm remained unchanged, several heterodox measures were 
introduced in economic policies, which gave this era a more pragmatic and less ideological 
character.  
 
On 5 Oct.1988, a national referendum was held to determine whether Pinochet would be 
maintained at the head of the state for another eight years. As the “no” vote won with 55.99%, the 
General was forced to resign his position following the 1989 presidential elections.  
 
From March 1990 to 2010, the country was administrated by governments stemming from the 
Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, a coalition of center-left parties. The four successive 
presidents were Patricio Aylwin (1990-94, Christian democrat), Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000, 
Christian democrat), Ricardo Lagos (2000-06, social democrat) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-10, 
socialist). The conservative candidate Sebastián Piñera won the Chilean presidential election in 2010. 
Governments of the Concertación sought to avoid a brutal break with the economic policies in force 
and opted for a “change in continuity” (Laban and Larrain, 1995). Under the first two administrations 
Chile experienced one of the most prosperous and stable periods of its economic history with an 
annual average growth rate of more than 7% between 1990 and 1998 when the Asian crisis spread 
to Latin America (Ffrench-Davis, 2008). Between 1990 and 2006, the effective GDP grew 5.5% 
annually in average.   
  
 
Interuniversity Attraction Pole (IAP) on social enterprise (SOCENT) – 2012-2017 
www.iap-socent.be 
 
(b) The rise and fall of popular economy in Chile 
 
Popular sectors were disproportionately affected by neoliberal economic reforms (Oxhorn, 1995). In 
addition, many who had acquired a certain level of education and been expelled from the formal 
sphere of the economy, joined popular sectors. According to Martínez and Tironi (1985, p. 146), this 
implied “a displacement of approximately 103,000 workers from regular wage-earning employment 
to independent [informal] employment or open employment” so that the informal sector accounted 
for 37% of all employment in 1986 (Angell, 1989). The arrival of these workers with better 
participation and organizational skills and greater social consciousness changed the social, political 
and cultural landscape of the popular world (Nyssens, 1997). Parallel to this, traditional spaces for 
popular participation (political parties, unions, neighborhood committees, etc.) were repressed. 
Ironically, the conjunction of these two factors–the new political and socio-cultural landscape of 
popular sectors and the repression of traditional popular participatory institutions–encouraged the 
mushrooming of popular sector groups and a modification of the political locus for the benefit of 
non-partisan actors, who were more difficult to repress (Garretón, 2001; Posner, 2004). The second 
half of the 1980s thus could be called the “Golden age of the popular economy in Chile”. In 1987, 
around 220,000 persons, i.e. 16% of the population of poblaciones 3 , belonged to a popular 
organization of some kind, whether productive or not (Oxhorn, 1994b; see also Garretón, 2001). 
 
Parties from the Concertación explicitly took into account the interests of popular sectors. Indeed, 
during the 1989 campaign, the coalition committed itself to repaying the enormous “social debt” 
inherited from the military regime (Oxhorn, 1994a). Consistently, the state substantially increased 
social expenses dedicated to the poorest, and in July 1990 established the ministry of planification 
and cooperation (Mideplan) to administrate these resources. Moreover, the Aylwin government 
recognized the significant role that popular organizations could play under the newly restored 
democratic regime. This government also set up the División de Organizaciones Sociales (DOS), a 
bureau in charge of ensuring the interface between the government and various community 
organizations on the assumption that a genuine democracy needs autonomous organizations within 
civil society and that the state must facilitate their emergence (DOS, 1990). The programs of this 
organization precisely aimed to promote the creation of popular organizations as alternatives to the 
action of the state to assist the poor by explicitly attempting to preserve the positive experience of 
popular organizational activity during the dictatorship. Yet, the aspirations for more social equity 
were subordinated to the need for a compromise with the right wing regarding the institutional 
reform and the maintenance of macroeconomic stability through the continued implementation of 
free-market policies (Ffrench-Davis, 2008). In fact, as will appear later on, the ruling political parties' 
wish to support the popular economy was compromised from an early stage and its achievement very 
limited. Indeed, the Golden age of the Chilean popular economy seems to belong to the past: the 
number of popular organizations has declined sharply4. To account for this decrease, we can rely on 
the two necessary conditions for the emergence and sustainability of social economy initiatives 
identified by Defourny and Develtere (2000): the condition of necessity and that of collective identity. 
The former refers to the pressure of acute material difficulties while the latter refers to the sense of 
sharing a collective identity or a common destiny within a close-knit social group. Of the two, the 
latter seems particularly crucial because “When the popular sectors are characterized by both a weak 
                                           
3 This term refers to Chile's peripheral and marginalized urban areas; they are the equivalents of Argentina’s 
“villas miseria” and of Brazil’s “favelas”. 
4 To our knowledge, there does not exist any actualized statistical database listing popular economy initiatives in 
Chile. However, a recent report dedicated to networks and institutions of the solidarity economy (Romá Martí, 
2010) mentions 132 organizations for the whole country. The category “networks and organizations of 
producers” comprises 21 organizations at the national level. Despite the difficulty of surveying popular 
organizations, these numbers appear to differ widely from those available concerning the end of the 1980s: in 
1989, there were still 2,479 PEOs just for the Metropolitan Region and the province of San Antonio, (Donovan 
& Gonzalez, 2004). 
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sense of collective identity and low levels of collective action, popular organizations will tend to be 
atomized and short-lived. People will move in and out of organizations according to changes in their 
material situation and the availability of alternative solution” (Oxhorn, 1994b, p. 60). 
 
In the present case, both conditions clearly contributed to the development of popular economy 
organizations (PEOs) over the past decades: an important part of the population, excluded from 
mainstream employment and social protection, shared important unsatisfied needs and the identity of 
poblador (shantytown dweller). Today, however, while the condition of necessity is still present, the 
condition of identity seems to be lacking in Chilean popular sectors, which could partly explain the 
decline of the PEO movement. 
 
As for the condition of necessity, despite remarkable economic vitality over the last years, Chile's 
poverty level in 2009 still reached 15.1% of the population, among which 3.7% of indigents 
(MIDEPLAN, 2009). The situation is different regarding the condition of identity: although popular 
sectors were still sharing an inspiring identity reference in the 1980s, such as that of poblador, this 
has weakened over the years. One important symptom of this phenomenon is widespread political 
apathy and disenchantment among popular sectors (Oxhorn, 1994b; Posner, 1999, 2004), which is 
empirically supported by falling (though legally mandatory) participation to municipal elections. From 
1992 to 1996, the proportion of null and blank votes rose from 8.9% to 10.21% (Posner, 1999). 
When combining the 1996 figure with the abstention rate, the total reaches 23.14% (Servicio 
Electoral República de Chile, 1997). For the 2000 municipal elections, this figure amounted to 
20.46% (Servicio Electoral República de Chile, 2001). The turnout for neighborhood association 
(juntas de vecinos) elections is also very low, about 2% of the eligible population (Posner, 1999). In 
fact, the identity of poblador failed the test of various events and, in particular, the return to 
democracy, for at least two reasons–one political and the other economic–developed hereafter. 
 
Concerning the first reason, it is necessary to explore the evolution of the relationships between the 
elites of political parties and popular sectors during the democratic transition. From May 1983 to 
about June 1986, the parties opposing the dictatorship essentially relied on social mobilization, which 
was increasingly dominated by popular sectors, to secure the transition toward democracy (Oxhorn, 
1994b). By contrast, the return to democracy in 1990 and the events leading up to it were dominated 
by parties and political elites; these deliberately sought to demobilize popular sectors and to channel 
their political activities towards electoral forms of political participation only. Indeed, the opposition to 
the military dictatorship considered a massive electoral support essential to increase their negotiating 
power in the face of the military junta before the 1989 presidential elections and against the right 
wing under the new democratic regime. The opposition to Pinochet’s regime, hence, devoted all its 
efforts to the maximizing votes, especially among popular sectors given their numerical importance. 
Implementing this strategy implied that all activities indirectly related to the electoral process, 
including PEO activities, were considered mere epiphenomena.  
 
Olavarría (2003) and Bresnahan (2003) emphasize the links existing between the political 
marginalization of popular sectors and the institutional pressures weighing on the political parties at 
the end of the dictatorship to pursue the economic policies influenced by Pinochet's neoliberal 
ideology. Indeed, the junta's influence extended well beyond the return to democracy through 
constraints on the decision-making and the representation capacities of political institutions sealed in 
the 1980 Constitution. This, for instance, proclaimed the military the “guardians of democracy” and 
sanctioned a series of “authoritarian enclaves” among which 9 designated senators–2 chosen by the 
president, 3 by the Supreme Court and 4 by the National Security Council, dominated by the military. 
They were thus ensuring a majority for the right wing at the Senate. The authoritarian enclaves also 
consisted of a binomial electoral law that produced an overrepresentation of the right, and an 
amnesty law for the crimes committed by the military. The Constitution as well gave Pinochet a 
permanent siege at the Senate, which he occupied from 1998 to 2002, which brought the number of 
non-democratically elected senators to 10 out of 48. This system of non-elected senators was 
removed during the reform of the Constitution in Aug. 2005. According to Olavarría (2003), the 
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political elites' response to these constraints guaranteeing the continuity of neoliberal policies 
consisted in adopting a technocratic approach to the political activity, which weakened their 
relationships with popular sectors and contributed to their demobilization. Bresnahan (2003) also 
mentions that the pursuit of neoliberal measures was supported by the main external actors–
international financial institutions, the United States, transnational capital–whose hostility could have 
threatened the democratic transition. Maintaining neoliberal measures was also part of the 
compromise made by the government to the national right-wing parties. 
 
Some confusion among popular sectors also contributed to their demobilization. For many PEO 
leaders, the elections were a totally novel experience, either because they were too young to have 
participated to the democratic regime in pre-dictatorial Chile or because they had not taken part in 
any political activity before their mobilization within PEOs under the military junta. Moreover, popular 
sectors had hitherto never had an autonomous role in any kind of democratic process. Hence, these 
leaders were not in a favorable position to create innovative forms of alternative political participation 
in a context dominated by parties willing to restore traditional forms. 
 
This analysis as a whole supports the view of a political marginalization of popular sectors since the 
democratic transition, which is explained by a change in the strategy of parties opposing the junta; by 
the institutional and international constraints on these parties, which pushed them to embrace the 
neoliberal vision and by a certain confusion among popular sectors, as explained above. 
Consequently, the collective identity of the poblador, which, around the mid-1980s, had brought 
together the popular sectors around a common will to implement collective solutions to their 
economic, political, social and cultural marginalization, began to disintegrate from 1987 onward. It 
is worth mentioning, though, that the increasing exclusion of popular sectors as a collective actor 
does not mean that their interests were not taken into account by the parties in power, at least at the 
beginning. 
 
The second reason for the popular sectors' fragmented collective identity is economic and lies in the 
pursuit, for almost 40 years, of neoliberal policies that left great flexibility to the market and 
encouraged the development of individual strategies. These policies resulted in dwindling state 
support to collective initiatives developed by popular sectors. This is illustrated by the decentralization 
process of government administration mentioned above: while substantial administrative 
responsibilities were transferred to municipalities, notably for health care and education (Kubal, 
2006), their fiscal and policy-making autonomy remained seriously constrained since taxes were still 
set and collected by the central authority (Yáñez & Letelier, 1995). This left little capacity for local 
governments to construct policies or to provide resources to respond to grassroots initiatives’ needs 
and concerns (Posner, 2004). 
 
In addition, these neoliberal policies increased competition among all actors on the market, leaving 
little room for collective experiments driven by non-exclusively economic objectives. The neoliberal 
position of Chile, which was very open to globalized trade, also contributed to the weakening of the 
PEO movement. Indeed, many organizations were active in small manufacturing and handicraft 
(embroidery, puppets, fabric and clothes, woodcraft…). The opening of the country to imports from 
countries where wages are considerably lower (China, India, etc.) caused many of these small 
workshops to close down because they could not compete with these imports; their members, 
therefore, had to disperse and individually look for other sources of income5. This is supported by 
empirical evidence: in their analysis of the impact of increased Chinese imports on the Chilean 
manufacturing sector, Álvarez and Claro (2009) found that the former negatively affect employment 
growth as well as the chances of survival of manufacturing plants while firms have limited ability to 
escape these imports. In another article, Álvarez and Opazo (2011) highlight a significant decrease 
                                           
5According to an interview with the former president of the Fundación Solidaridad, an institution supporting 
PEOs. 
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in relative wages in sectors—and especially small firms—exposed to higher Chinese-import 
penetration. 
 
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
(a) Analytical framework 
 
After presenting the contextual elements related to the historical evolution of PEOs in Chile, we now 
turn to the in-depth analysis of a sample of PEOs in Santiago de Chile. This section, therefore, 
presents an analytical framework along with some methodological elements. 
 
Neoclassical economics provides few tools for an in-depth study of production organizations. Indeed, 
the enterprise is analyzed in purely narrow, technical terms, its raison d’être being the maximization 
of profits. It is seen as a “black box” that varies according to the production function; it formalizes the 
state of the technology, i.e. the relationship between inputs and outputs, at a given point in time 
(Lemaître, 2009b). Contract theories constitute a second traditional approach of the organization 
(Akerlof, 1970; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition to production 
costs, they also take into account transaction costs, and the transactional aspects are central to the 
analysis. According to Eymard-Duvernay (2004: 32), “the concept of the firm as a production 
function is supplanted by the concept of the firm as a structure of coordination” of contracts. While 
the firm exists by virtue of market imperfections arising from informational problems, these theories 
present it as an extension of the market in the sense that it is a “legal fiction” (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). That is to say, it is an artificial legal construction, with no real existence as a collective entity, 
created to concentrate a whole lot of contractual relations similar to the market (Coriat & Weinstein, 
1995). The third main traditional approach, the so-called new institutional economics, is a vast field 
of inquiry that goes beyond a mere contractual approach and aims at the study of economic 
organizations as institutions to show their efficiency as governance structures (North, 1990; 
Williamson, 1975, 1985). This constitutes considerable progress for the analysis of economic 
initiatives since it becomes possible to study them in greater depth, and especially to apprehend their 
diversity. Even from this approach, though, organizational forms—like other institutions—are 
explained in terms of market failures: they emerge when the market cannot allocate resources 
efficiently, i.e. by minimizing costs. The standard neoclassical theory and its extensions (Favereau, 
2006) thus adopt either a minimal vision of the enterprise (Eymard-Duvernay, 2004) or a vision in 
terms of an efficient solution, seeing it as maximizing efficiency (Granovetter, 2000). Traditional 
approaches leave little room for the plurality of logics underlying popular economy initiatives. On the 
other hand, a popular economy analytical framework understands the economy as an 
institutionalized political process. It views the production unit not only in terms of its organizational 
dimension but also in its institutional context. 
 
Consequently, orthodox economic paradigms mostly reduce the modern enterprise to the capitalist 
firm led by investors with the aim of maximizing profits. This probably explains the pretension of the 
capitalist model to constitute the universal organizational archetype, both in economic models and in 
public development policies, which are very often directly inspired from them. 
 
This reductionism also holds for informal sector economic models, based on the implicit assumption 
that development proceeds by means of growth in the formal (modern) sector. The informal sector is 
studied as to its place and its role in relation to the formal sector (Perry et al., 2007), and its analysis 
is generally functional to the formal one. Little research has been carried out about the identities and 
the inner operating rationales developed by such a huge amount of diverse economic initiatives and 
about how they interact with their environment (multidimensional public policies, global economic 
trends, etc.). Informality, however, is a very significant and persistent phenomenon. It was estimated 
that in 2006 40% to 50% of Chilean enterprises operated informally (Contreras et al., 2008). As little 
empirical and theoretical progress has been made in this research area, a popular economy 
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analytical framework means to open the black box of this reality, thus bringing to light the diversity of 
economic practices developed by popular groups to meet their own and their relatives' material and 
immaterial needs through their own efforts and other available resources (Sarria Icaza & Tiriba, 
2005). In the Latin American context, the popular economy framework also emphasizes the contrast 
between the economic practices of national elites and those developed by popular sectors 
(Hillenkamp, 2009). As for popular economy organizations, they represent the collective components 
of these economic practices. They are defined as organizations gathering individuals who share a 
same situation (whether they live in the same area, work in the same company, belong to the same 
religious community or share similar political orientations). They gather to face up to common 
economic challenges and, particularly, to meet their basic needs. To do so, they develop activities in 
the spheres of production, distribution or consumption of goods and services (Razeto, 1990).  
 
Hence, in order to overcome the reductionism of traditional economic thought, we sought to build a 
theoretical model of the firm based on the existing literature, one which would allow us to capture not 
only the characteristics of the traditional capitalist firm but the logics of other forms of organization 
(see table 2). 
 
Table 2. Models of capitalist firm and of popular economic organization 
 
  Capitalist firm Popular economic organization 
Finality Capital accumulation Enlarged reproduction of group members’ life 
Beneficiary category Investors Active members, members’ families and/or 
members of the community 
Dominant category Investors Active members 
Source: Created by authors. 
 
The finality of the organization refers to the objectives that motivate its creation. This is generally the 
decisive criterion used to distinguish the different types of enterprises, and which determines the 
different aspects of their structure and functioning logics. Whereas the capitalist firm is supposed to 
have a finality of profit maximization and to pursue capital accumulation (Eymard-Duvernay, 2004), 
popular economy organizations pursue a finality of so-called “enlarged reproduction of life” 
(Coraggio, 1999, 2006). Beyond the “simple reproduction”6, it is a process of sustained improvement 
of the quality of life of those concerned, and achieved over an extended period of time (e.g. one 
generation). While this process generally takes place at the household level, it can also constitute the 
finality of collective practices, such as community social networks of exchange and mutual help or, as 
in our case, popular economy organizations. The process of enlarged reproduction of life presents 
two main dimensions: a material and a symbolic one (Coraggio, 2006). The material reproduction 
refers to goods and services such as food, housing, clothes, education, care etc. and is often 
characterized by the presence of forms of solidarity between members. The symbolic reproduction of 
each of the members refers to the participation to rituals or other institutions with a symbolic value, 
the affirmation in the public space etc.  
  
                                           
6 According to Coraggio (1999), this term does not refer to mere subsistence (or biological reproduction) but to 
a morally acceptable minimal standard of biological and social quality of life evolving according to basic social 
needs. 
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The enlarged reproduction is materialized, among other things, by what some authors call strategies 
of risk minimization and diversification. Indeed, if the objective is the improvement of the quality of 
life of the household or the organization’s members rather than the extension of the activity, groups 
will logically seek to secure their income rather than take thoughtless risks (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007; 
Gomez, 2008). 
 
As regards the beneficiary category, according to Razeto (1991), any form of enterprise pursues the 
maximization of a surplus, i.e. the difference between the total revenues and the total expenses of the 
enterprise. What distinguishes the different forms of enterprise is the use that is made of this surplus 
or, in other words, their beneficiary categories–a concept developed by Gui (1991) that designates 
the category owning the rights on this surplus. Furthermore, as Gui (1991) explains, the distribution 
of the latter is not necessarily carried out in an explicit way–under the form of dividends or boni, for 
instance– but can also be implicit, without any established contract–as in the case of discounts for 
members or an increased quality of goods and services. In this perspective, the expression of 
“potential surplus” is used to designate the surplus distributed by the organization both in explicit and 
implicit ways to the beneficiary category. It is worth mentioning that this category is often directly 
related to the finality of the organization. 
 
As for the concept of dominant category, also defined by Gui (1991), it designates the actors who 
have the residual control rights, i.e. the decision-making power that is not shared with other 
stakeholders in the statutes or by (informal) contract (Lemaître, 2009a). The dominant category is 





This theoretical framework–based on the concepts of finality, beneficiary category and dominant 
category–was applied during a field research project conducted in Santiago de Chile from March to 
June 2012 for the obtention of a master's thesis in economics (Bauwens, 2012). We conducted a 
multi-case study (Yin, 2009) with a sample of popular organizations (n=24), located in different 
peripheral districts of Santiago (poblaciones). We considered that a case study design is especially 
suited for inductive theory building through an in-depth understanding of processes, particular events 
or situations (Eisenhardt, 1989), and that multiple cases yield more grounded and accurate results 
than a single one (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
 
This case study was based on semi-structured interviews with members of the organizations 
concerned. Additionally, we interviewed a former executive director of the Fundacíon Solidaridad, a 
support structure that closed down in 2011 after 36 years of activity, and four scholars specialized in 
popular movements in Chile. In total, 29 interviews were conducted, all of which were digitally 
recorded and transcribed.    
 
To select our sample, our hope, initially, was to gain access to the existing database of support 
institutions, among which we would have randomly selected a representative sample of organizations 
for our case study. This hope was based on previous empirical research on popular organizations in 
Santiago de Chile.  As indeed this data was becoming outdated (see e.g. Nyssens and Van der 
Linden, 2000), we still banked on the existence of several thousands of PEOs. After exploring various 
possibilities, however, our approach had to be abandoned, owing to the declining number of PEOs 
described in the previous section and the recent closure of various emblematic support institutions, 
such as the NGOs PET (Programa de Economía del Trabajo, Program of Labor Economics), 
Fundación Solidaridad and PROSAM (Programa de Acción con Mujeres, Action Program with 
Women). Whereas we kept our main focus on our initial research question, new sub-questions 
emerged: why did popular sectors favor individual strategies to the detriment of collective initiatives? 
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Do associative initiatives still exist, perhaps under new or different forms?  And if so, what are the 
factors fostering or impeding their development? 
 
Due to the absence of complete and up-to-date database, we had to modify our initial purpose and 
adopt a more exploratory and abductive approach. We set ourselves the task of compiling a sample 
of subsisting popular collective initiatives on the urban territory of the Santiago Province. Meanwhile, 
we adapted our interviews in the search for answers to our new questions. This approach shed light 
on the existence of associative forms differing significantly from traditional PEOs (see next section). 
Organizations were selected by theoretical sampling (Flick 2009), a sampling method “tied to the 
purpose of generating and developing theoretical ideas rather than being aimed either at producing 
findings that are representative of a population or at testing hypotheses” (Hammersley, 2006, p.298). 
We contacted two institutions: the FOSIS (Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversión Social), a governmental 
organism whose mission is to provide vulnerable people and micro-entrepreneurs with financial and 
technical support, and the Vicaría de Pastoral Social y de los Trabajadores, a NGO depending upon 
the Catholic Church. Through these two institutions, we managed to contact 16 PEOs. We named the 
organizations belonging to this first group “activity-based organizations” (see section 4.1). We also 
identified another type of associative initiatives (n=8), which we named “territorial organizations” (see 
section 4.2). Although the latter present a lower “degree of collectiveness”, they constitute a more 
recent form of popular associative dynamics that, to our knowledge, has not yet been studied in Chile 
and, interestingly, lead us to reconsider our initial hypotheses. To derive theoretical insights from the 
interviews, we followed an analytic induction approach (Manning 1982), "a research strategy of data 
collection and analysis which explicitly takes the deviant case as a starting point for testing models or 
theories developed in research" (Flick, 2006, p.4). We iterated between empirical data collection and 
theory review until theoretical saturation was reached.      
 
On the basis of the analytical framework developed above, each dimension–the organizations' 
finality and their beneficiary and dominant categories–has been tested through several empirically 
identifiable indicators ( see table 3).       
 
Table 3. Dimensions and indicators studied 
 
Dimensions Indicators 
Finality - I.1.1. Explicit objectives 
- I.1.2. Employment growth 
- I.1.3. Sales growth 
- I.1.4. Presence of extra-economic activities, such as 
cultural, social, political or recreational ones 
- I.1.5. Diversification of income sources 
Beneficiary category - I.2.1. Surplus allocation 
- I.2.2. Presence of support mechanisms in case of work 
interruption 
Dominant category - I.3.1. Presence of a general assembly 
- I.3.2. (Non-)democratic nature of decision-making 
processes 
- I.3.3. (Non-)democratic nature of executive management 
             Source: Created by authors. 
 
The interview guide remained open, according to the methodology of semi-structured interviews. The 
themes to be explored included: 1) some socio-demographic and other objective facts about the 
organization and its members (gender distribution,  average age,  education level, activity sector, 
year of creation and degree of formalization ); 2) the three dimensions of the analytical framework 
and, specifically, the aforementioned indicators; and 3) questions relating to the history and evolution 
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of groups, their relationships with external actors, especially support institutions and the difficulties 
encountered. This third set of themes essentially aimed to answer the aforementioned sub-questions.  
 
In the case of activity-based organizations, 12 interviews took place in the presence of all members 
and 4 with the leader only; in the case of territorial organizations, all interviews were with the leader 
only as these tend to be significantly larger. The in-depth analysis of these organizations made it 
possible to collect both quantitative and qualitative data about the studied aspects. 
 
4. ANALYSIS OF THE FUNCTIONING LOGICS OF POPULAR ECONOMY 
ORGANIZATIONS IN SANTIAGO DE CHILE 
 
Our sample concerns two types of organizations, which we named respectively “activity-based 
organizations” (n=16) and “territorial organizations” (n=8). On the basis of our analytical 
framework, we outline the finalities and logics of each type along with their members’ socio-
economic profile. 
 
(a) Activity-based organizations 
 
(i) General information 
 
The groups belonging to the first category gather people who work collectively for the production of 
similar goods or services. These groups are informal except for two having a legal personality. 
Indeed, especially for the oldest groups that were created under the dictatorship, the few advantages 
of legalization do not appear to be worth the cost (time, administrative procedures etc.). The groups 
range between less than one to 39 years' existence and fall within 3 generations: the 1st-generation 
groups, created under the dictatorship, i.e. existing for at least 22 years (n=7), the 2nd-generation 
groups, for 6 to 16 years (n=5) and the 3rd–generation groups, for less than 5 years (n=4). The latter 
were formed mainly to attract financial resources from supporting governmental institutions making 
the creation of collectives conditional to funding. This, however, is not to ignore the strong affective 
relationships between members. 
 
As for the groups' members and their socio-economic profile, they are mostly women from 
poblaciones with a weak to average education level.  Just two groups counted one man among their 
members. This disproportionate gender representation is consistent with the findings of various 
authors, who show that women are overrepresented in informal self-employment while males are 
more often informal employers or regular informal wage workers.7 
 
In many groups and particularly 1st generation ones, the members' average age is relatively high as it 
ranges between 61 and 70 years.   
 
From an economic point of view, 14 out of 16 groups are active in the craftwork sector (embroidery, 
clothing, puppets, leather craft…) and the remaining 2 offer catering services. These groups count 
but between 2 and 25 people, they create little employment and generate little income, the level of 
generated revenue for the majority of groups standing below 100,000 Chilean pesos per month8. 
Furthermore, as they do not have any fixed retail outlet and as the demand for their products is 
generally very variable, most are confronted with serious commercialization problems. 
                                           
7 According to Maloney (2004), one possible explanation for this disproportionate gender representation in 
informal self-employment may be found in some desirable characteristics of the sector, especially flexibility. 
Indeed, since women generally bare the reproductive tasks of the household, the sector of small independent 
activities would better enable them to balance their reproductive and productive roles. 
8  On 20 July 2012, 100,000 Chilean pesos were equivalent to 167.8 euros and 205.9 dollars 
(http://www.bcentral.cl/). As a comparison, the minimum wage in Chile is fixed to 182,000 Chilean pesos.  
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As regards relationships with external actors, all groups did –or still do– receive some form of support 
(funding, commercialization opportunities, training, premises etc.) by different organisms according 
to the generation they belong to: 1st- and 2nd-generation groups are or have been supported mainly 
by secular NGOs, such as the NGO SOL (Solidaridad y Organización Local, Solidarity and Local 
Organization), or by organizations depending upon the Catholic Church, such as the “Vicaría de 
Pastoral Social y de los Trabajadores” or the “Fundación Solidaridad”, and unsurprisingly so as the 
Church  provided a protective umbrella to organizational activity during the dictatorship. As to 3rd-
generation groups, they are mainly supported by governmental organisms and programs, whose 
mission it is to offer funding and training to small initiatives from vulnerable sectors, and by 
municipalities. This difference among group generations reflects a deeper change in support 
institutions, namely decreasing support from the traditional supporting actors under the dictatorship, 
such as the Church9 and secular or religious NGOs, and emerging governmental actors, which either 
did not exist or did not play this role under the dictatorship and are the result of the more progressive 
positions of the various governments under the democratic regime. 
 
A related question arising during interviews concerns the dependence of organizations upon external 
actors. Indeed, many 1st-generation groups (5 out of 7) and some 2nd-generation groups (2 out of 5) 
today commercialize their production very sporadically, to say the least. Until recently, these groups 
sold almost their whole output to the Fundación Solidaridad, which, in turn, distributed it abroad 
through fair trade networks. When, however, the latter put an end to its activities in 2010, the groups 
did not find other commercial outlets for their products. Those interviewed continue to meet and work 
together but mostly to exchange techniques, learn from each other and maintain long-time social 
and friendly relationships. These observations are first indications that these groups do not pursue 
capital accumulation and expansion as a finality but gather for other purposes. Informants from one 
of these groups told us that, when they were supported by the Fundación Solidaridad, they knew the 
country of destination of their products but ignored the clients’ precise identity and did not get to find 
out more about the market: thus they did not know the exact sale price or quantities. Their role, from 
an economic perspective, was confined to dealing with the orders placed by the Fundación and to be 
remunerated for this. In some cases, the Fundacíon itself provided them with raw materials (wool, 
fabric…). It clearly appears that there existed a dependence relationship between a significant 




• I.1.1. Explicit objectives  
 
As a first indicator of their organization's finality, all groups were asked to classify the following 
statements according to their importance that they represent for their activity: 1) growth of sales and 
activities, 2) job creation for people of the broader community, 3) creation of a stable income for the 
family of the organization’s members and 4) creation and maintenance of social and emotional 
bonds. This data reveals some interesting indications regarding the finality of the organization as 
expressed by the actors themselves. Table 4 presents the answers received from the organizations 
and reads as follows: the numbers in the cells represent the number of groups that have ranked first 
the statement of the corresponding column. For each generation, the growth of activities seems to be 
the least important priority while the creation of a stable family income comes first.  
  
                                           
9 With the return of democracy, the Church took the position that the civilian government was responsible for 
resolving social issues linked to poverty and thus concentrated its resources on more explicitly religious activities. 
Consistently, it has been gradually distancing itself from popular-sector organizational activities (Oxhorn, 
1995).    
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Creation of jobs in 
the community 
Creation of a stable 
family income for 
members 






1 2 3 1  
2nd 
generation 
1 1 3 –  
3rd 
generation 
1 – 3 –  
Total 3 3 9 1  
                Source: Created by authors. 
 
• I.1.2. and I.1.3. Evolution of volumes of employment and sales 
 
Table 5 presents the distribution of activity-based organizations according to the evolution of their 
volume of activity, both in terms of revenues and in terms of employment between their year of 
creation and 2012.  
 
Table 5. Distribution of groups according to the evolution of their volume of activity between their year 
of creation and 2012 
 
 Revenues Employment 
Growth 5 2 
Stagnation 8 2 
Regression 3 12 
Total 16 16 
                                   Source: Created by authors. 
 
It appears that, for a majority of organizations (11 out of 16), the volume of sales either stagnated or 
decreased. As far as employment is concerned, the number of workers for many initiatives (12 
organizations) fell gradually, a fact that can be accounted for by the tendencies presented in section 
2, especially for the oldest initiatives, and more generally by the lack of individual incentives to stay in 
the group. This absence of sustained growth trend in revenues and employment suggests that these 
groups are more survival oriented and means either that the group does not pursue capital 
accumulation or that it is not able to achieve it. Hence, to determine the finality of organizations, 
other indicators must be considered, such as the presence of extra-economic activities within groups, 
notably political ones. 
 
• I.1.4. Presence of extra-economic activities 
 
In this perspective, various authors have advocated the necessity to integrate gender in economic 
analysis (e.g. Benería, 1995; Elson, 1999; Sen, 1996) and particularly “to look beyond market 
activity per se to nonmarket activity and to women’s well-being more generally” (Sen, 1996, p. 822). 
Since the majority of organizations are mostly composed of women, it is interesting to look at their 
extra-economic dimensions through gender analysis. Several interviewees confirmed that these 
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activities provide their female members with the satisfaction and the dignity to earn their own income. 
In addition, since these women are generally more involved than their husband in sustaining their 
household and reproductive labor, this independent source of income gives them more autonomy in 
the decisions to be made in order to provide for their family. 
 
Secondly, for the oldest or 1st-generation PEOs, the economic activity was secondary really to the 
political one, which in the past at least was very important: many of them were involved in social 
movements (of women, workers etc.). Some, under the aegis of the Catholic Church, took part in 
protests against the military regime and in actions supporting the parties opposing the junta. Beyond 
their technical and professional training, members of 1st-generation PEOs also took part in citizenship 
education activities, as they became aware of their economic, political and social exclusion. Several 
participants insisted on the importance of personal development through productive activity. 
According to one of them, “The workshop taught us to grow as women”. Thus, 1st-generation PEOs 
correspond quite faithfully to the concept of “policy-driven cooperatives” such as defined in the 
typology proposed by Lemaître and Helmsing (2012), where the economic activity supports citizen 
awareness. 
 
Yet, this intense political activity fell sharply over the years. NGOs no longer give training in matters 
of civic education and social movements have broken up. Still, the political dimension is present 
today, even in the more recent organizations, i.e. the 2nd- and 3rd-generation ones, while the 3rd-
generation groups are more centered on the economic aspect. For instance, the–mostly female–
organizations which the members of 3rd-generation PEOs also belong to essentially strive to reinforce 
their entrepreneurial and managerial competences.  
 
• I.1.5. Diversification of sources of income 
 
The last indicator related to the organization's finality is the diversification of sources of income (and, 
therefore, risk). Indeed, as explained in the previous section, members give priority to risk 
diversification and prefer several small sources of income rather than a large one (Gomez, 2008). In 
the case of activity-based organizations, the activities developed by the groups are, for all members, 
subsidiary activities. These, indeed, are coupled with other sources of income, such as other small 
economic activities operated individually, the husbands' income or some social allowance. An 
informant explained that the activity of their workshop depends on the husbands' work and increases 
if these become unemployed. This flexibility enables women who are responsible for their family to 
combine their professional activity with reproductive labor.      
 
(iii) Beneficiary category 
 
• I.2.1. Surplus allocation 
 
As regards the beneficiary category and the surplus allocation, which represents only small amounts, 
the majority (n=9) distributes it among its workers according to their productivity, i.e. according to the 
number of produced pieces or, in one case, according to the numbers of worked hours (see table 6). 
Five organizations divide it equally among their workers, namely among two 1st-generation and three 
2nd-generation groups. Among these cases, 4 do not distribute the integral surplus to workers but set 
aside a residual fraction–between 5 to 10%–to constitute a small reserve. One (3rd-generation) 
organization only allocates its surplus to one person. In the latter case, workers are informal paid 
workers, whereas in the 15 other cases, the surplus constitutes their remuneration. One group 
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Table 6. Distribution of groups according to the surplus allocation 
 
Use of the surplus Number of 
organizations 
1. Divided  
1.1. Among workers 
Equal shares 2 
Equal shares + small reserve 3 
According to needs 0 
According to productivity 8 
According to productivity + small 
reserve 
1 
1.2. Assigned to 1 person 1 
2. Reinvested in the activity  
2.1. Capital investments 0 
2.2. Investments in raw material 1 
Total 16 
                                           Source: Created by authors. 
 
• I.2.2. Presence of support mechanisms in case of work interruption 
 
On the other hand, 9 organizations out of 16 somehow show solidarity with the workers constrained 
to temporarily stop working owing to disease or death. These organizations either remunerate their 
workers as usual–for the groups that distribute the surplus in equal shares–, pay them less than usual, 
or collect money or goods, sometimes thanks to an organized event (e.g. bingo). In addition, 8 
organizations out of 16 contribute time or money to individuals or groups within their own 
community. 
 
These various observations highlight the solidarity, relative but real, pervading economic 
relationships, be it among group members or within the community at large. They suggest that the 
beneficiary category of these initiatives, rather than the shareholders, is the organizations' members 
and their families, if not also community members.   
 
(iv) Dominant category 
 
• I.3.1. Presence of an assembly 
 
As far as the dominant category is concerned, all organizations have a general assembly composed 
of workers which the majority systematically attend, except for one 3rd-generation organization–the 
one in which the surplus was allocated to one person, and in which essential decisions are taken by 
this same person.  
 
• I.3.1. and I.3.2. Nature of decision-making and executive management processes 
 
Except for this organization, decision-making processes are democratic since decisions are made 
either according to the “one person, one vote” rule or by consensus. As for the executive 
management process, this, in 6 cases, involves all the workers, which is facilitated by the small size of 
the groups and by the high frequency of the meetings. The other two modalities of executive 
management are either the delegation to one person–a leader supposed to be democratically elected 
(n=5)–or the delegation to a group of people, usually a president, a secretary and a treasurer (n=5). 
Those groups adopting these two modes of delegated management are sensibly larger than the rest. 
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(b) Territorial organizations 
 
(i) General information 
 
The eight organizations making up this second category, called here “territorial organizations”, differ 
from the previous ones in that what binds their members together is not their activity, which is 
undertaken individually, but the territory, i.e. generally the municipality. On the other hand, members 
of activity-based organizations share the production process in addition to the territory. In this sense, 
the “degree of collectiveness” within these organizations is lower than in activity-based organizations. 
Territorial organizations are also more recent; the oldest among them were created only 12 years 
ago (as compared to 39 years ago for the oldest activity-based organizations). They are craftsmen's  
organizations gathering various activities: jewellery, wood- or metal-based craftwork, clothing, 
basket-making, etc. Only two organizations also include other activity sectors: food, certain services 
and sales and purchasing activities. The groups count 24 members on average within a range 
extending from 7 to 47. 
 
While only 2 out of the 16 activity-based organizations are formalized, all territorial organizations 
have a legal personality, which suggests better capacity to achieve legal recognition than activity-
based organizations. This does not imply that all members, taken individually, have formally 
registered. In this respect, the degree of (in)formality indeed differs greatly from one organization to 
another: in one organization, only very few members are registered with the Service of Internal Taxes, 
while in another organization, this registration is a prerequisite for integrating the group. Between 
these two extremes, the remaining 6 organizations present a proportion of formally registered 
members varying from approximately 30 to 60%.   
 
Members’ socio-economic profiles share some common features with those of activity-based 
organizations': they are mostly female–although the proportion of men is larger here than in the first 
organization category–, they come from peripheral districts and the average age is between 35 and 
60 years. Most members have an education level somewhere in between primary and secondary 
school, although some hold a university degree (which is not the case of any activity-based 
organization). 
 
As regards their relationships with external actors, their main supporting institution is the municipality, 
the support of which however, varies considerably, let alone occasional conflicting relationships.  
Table 7 shows the general characteristics of activity-based versus territorial organizations. 
  
 
Interuniversity Attraction Pole (IAP) on social enterprise (SOCENT) – 2012-2017 
www.iap-socent.be 
Table 7. The activity-based organization and the territorial organization 
 
  Activity-based organizations (n=16) Territorial 
organizations (n=8) 
Element common to the members The territory and the production 
process 
The territory 
Average number of members 8 24 
Average duration of existence (in years) 17 7 
Level of education Low to average Average 
Number of organizations with legal 
personality 
2 8 
Supporting institutions Secular and religious NGOS (for 1st- 
and 2nd-generation); governmental 
institutions and the municipality 
The municipality 
Source: Created by authors. 
 
For the rest of this section, we tried as far as possible to follow the structure suggested by our model, 
as we did for activity-based organizations. Since the members of territorial organizations, however, 




• I.1.1. Explicit objectives 
 
Regarding their finality, while activity-based organizations’ members share a continuous production 
activity, those of territorial organizations gather on the basis of other common needs and goals: 
creating commercialization channels–in particular by holding fairs and by sharing their costs–
,organizing training sessions, applying to governmental projects for funding–these projects often 
require the collective character of the initiatives as a qualifying condition–, or promoting products, 
e.g. via a website. Seven out of eight groups established a system of monthly fees that members have 
to pay to cover the administrative and management costs of the organization. On the basis of these 
observations, it appears that the formation of territorial organizations is partly rooted in a logic of 
clustering: people associate to execute certain activities together as economies of scale resulting from 
their association reduce their average costs. Clustering also stimulates exchanges of knowledge and 
information between members and facilitates the access to certain services, such as credit, subsidies 
and training. These logics of clustering may also permeate activity-based organizations, if to a lower 
extent, as they did not come up in interviews.  
 
• I.1.4. Presence of extra-economic activities 
 
As regards their extra-economic activities, the political dimension of these territorial organizations is 
mainly centered on the corporatist interests of the sector. First of all, the organization increases 
workers’ negotiating power with authorities in order, among other things, to obtain strategic public 
spaces for holding fairs. As for craftsmen organizations, they claim a legal recognition of their status 
as craftsmen, which would guarantee them social protection as well as simplify administrative 
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procedures to export and sell their products throughout the country. These interests are sometimes 
represented in governmental or other institutions. For instance, the presidents of two organizations 
and two members of another represent their respective organization in the Consejo Nacional de la 
Cultura y las Artes, which belongs to the Ministry of Culture. Yet, the representation of the sector at 
meso and macro level is still embryonic, as we will see below. Besides these claims, some groups also 
seek to promote a fairer economy: two organizations belong to the "Nodo de Comercio Justo”, a fair 
trade organization network, and were present at the “Encuentro de Economía Solidaria” (Solidarity 
Economy Meeting), which took place in Talca (South of Santiago) in 2012. In 7 out of 8 cases, group 
members also organize recreational activities, such as dinners, traditional and religious celebrations 
etc. Two leaders mention their organization's social involvement: the one offering volunteer training 
in handcraft techniques (painting, fabric making, etc.) to children attending municipal schools; the 
other, collaborating with an association dedicated to helping homeless people.    
 
• I.1.5. Diversification of sources of income  
 
For a majority of groups in this category (n=5), the activity developed within the organization is not 
the members’ main source of income. The latter undertake other productive activities or benefit from 
other resources (a partner’s income, an allowance etc.). In three cases, however, members live 
exclusively from the activity developed within the organization. 
 
On the whole, the finality of territorial organizations seems to significantly depart from mere 
economic motivations to embrace some aspects of enlarged reproduction of the members’ life, as 
defined above. Although a logic of clustering is clearly present, these organizations also carry out 
political and social activities. Yet, political activity is centered on the corporatist interests of the sector 
and can be assimilated to lobbying. This is another distinction with activity-based organizations, 
whose political objectives are less subordinated to functional objectives and more related to the 
creation of citizen participation spaces per se, especially within 1st-generation groups.   
 
(iii) Beneficiary category 
 
• I.2.2. Presence of support mechanisms in case of work interruption 
 
Regarding their beneficiary category, these organizations do not distribute an explicit surplus stricto 
sensu because production activities are carried out individually. Yet, given our interest for the 
potential surplus as defined above, we also looked at other redistribution mechanisms. In this regard, 
4 out of 8 territorial organizations collect basic commodities or money to support those affected by 
work interruption. 
 
(iv) Dominant category 
 
• I.3.1. Presence of an assembly 
 
As far as the dominant category is concerned, all territorial organizations hold a general assembly of 
workers generally on a monthly basis.  
 
• I.3.2. and I.3.3. Nature of decision-making and executive management processes  
 
The decisions are made by consensus or on the principle of “one person, one vote” rule. Executive 
management, in all cases, is delegated to a democratically elected management committee 
consisting of a president, a secretary and a treasurer. The internal governance thus is participative, 
although certain decisions may be made by the management committee itself. Two organization 
presidents justified this practice by a lack of commitment on the part of the general assembly 
members. To curb absenteeism at general assembly meetings, one organization decided to set up a 
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system of penalties. Table 8 summarizes the findings in terms of finality, beneficiary category and 
dominant category for activity-based versus territorial organizations. 
 
Table 8. The activity-based organization and the territorial organization 
 
  Activity-based organizations Territorial organizations 
Finality - Absence of sustained growth trend 
- Presence of extra-economic activities 
- Creation of citizen participation spaces 
- Political activities declined over generations 
- Logic of clustering 
- Presence of extra-economic 
activities  




- Surplus distributed according to productivity for 
most groups 
- Presence of solidarity mechanisms in case of 
work interruption 
- Support to the broader community 
- Presence of solidarity mechanisms 




- Presence of a general assembly composed of 
workers 
- Democratic rules of decision (one person-one 
vote or consensus) 
- Presence of a general assembly 
composed of workers 
- Democratic rules of decision (one 
person-one vote or consensus) 
Source: Created by authors. 
 
(v) Specific challenges 
 
Finally, attention was paid to some challenges specific to territorial organizations. A first obstacle lies 
in mistrust among small producers. Asked why producers sharing the same activity did not cooperate 
in the production process, several leaders voiced the desire to protect their work against competition 
and plagiarism, especially in craftwork, as well as circumspection towards cooperation owing to 
unsuccessful past experiences. Sometimes, the benefits of cooperation did not occur to producers 
thinking that they manage better on their own and that “what [they] have, [they] don’t owe it to 
anyone”, as to a territorial organization leader. Another challenge for territorial organizations, 
mentioned by Allan San Juan and Reinecke (2006), lies in the fact that these organizations develop a 
vision that is essentially short-term and centered on specific and punctual problems; thus they 
struggle to transcend their local experience to articulate the interests and the contributions of the 
sector of micro-enterprises to national development strategies. In addition, they tend to consider the 
municipality as the institution par excellence of the territorial reality and as the administrative level 
that can address their demands in terms of public policies. This lack of representation at meso and 
macro level was emphasized by the president of one territorial organization who is also the head of 
the Confederación Nacional de Microempresarios y Artesanos de Chile (CONAMARCH), a 
federation of several organizations of micro-entrepreneurs that seeks to assert itself as a 
representative of the sector and a credible interlocutor in relationships with governmental authorities. 
According to her, while the federation still exists, it has not been able to take on a leadership role and 
its activity has declined severely over the past few years. 
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5. DISCUSSION: THEORETICAL FEEDBACK ON THE NOTIONS OF POPULAR 
ECONOMY ORGANIZATION AND OF COLLECTIVE INITIATIVE 
 
(a) The factors for the formation of collective initiatives 
 
Having analyzed the evolution of the Chilean popular economy and collected empirical results, we 
can infer some theoretical insights into the study of PEOs and the creation of collective initiatives. 
While we advanced in the 1990s that “apparently, the popular economy is now asserting itself and is 
being recognized as an active economic subject” (Nyssens, 1997), we must acknowledge that this 
assertion was too optimistic. The decreasing number of PEOs and the changes occurring among the 
various generations of PEOs lead us to qualify the theoretical discourse on the Chilean popular 
economy, as formulated in the 1980s and the early 1990s, in particular by Razeto (1991, 1993), by 
highlighting some key elements conditioning the dynamics of cooperation.   
 
A first element is the presence of a deeply rooted leadership. Indeed, the inability of the territorial 
organizations to assert themselves beyond the local level is partly due to the absence of unifying 
leaders able to open their somewhat narrow and short-term vision10. A second element of success 
and sustainability of collective productive experiences lies in the presence of what we call a pragmatic 
factor of cohesion, i.e. the need for individuals to clearly perceive the direct advantages of 
cooperating in the production process. Indeed, it is not because these advantages are real that they 
are seen as such by popular actors. As explained by a former leader of an institution supporting 
PEOs, “the member of the popular economy must live and provide for his/her family. Thus simply 
saying that in group, we are going to manage it, because all together, we can do it, if this doesn’t 
give him/her a real job opportunity, it doesn’t work”. If popular actors do not perceive the immediate 
benefits of cooperation when confronted with the realities of the Chilean globalized economy 
described above, they will focus on the individual generation of income. 
 
A third essential element that transpires from the research is the degree of trust among members, 
which constitutes a component of the condition of identity and which plays an important role in the 
voluntary setting up of collective initiatives. Within territorial organizations, in which the production 
process is not integrated, a climate of mistrust is prevalent, especially among craftsmen, for whom 
mistrust is a form of protection. As a territorial organization leader told us when asked why 
cooperation between members was not more developed, “my work is unique. I don’t associate 
because my partner would copy my work […]. We always pay attention to the protection of our work 
and here in Chile it’s very common”. 
 
These factors are all inherent to initiatives. Yet, as explained in section 2, the decline of the popular 
movement has been sped up by an alteration in the relationships between popular sectors and 
political elites and by the continued pursuit of neoliberal economic policies. Hence, a fourth, more 
macroeconomic factor influencing the dynamics of cooperation lies in the political and economic 
                                           
10  This importance of strong leadership is also illustrated by the case of the CUP (Comando Unitario de 
Pobladores, or Unitary Pobladores’ Command). This organization was created in 1986 at the Unitary Congress 
of Pobladores and results from an explicit will to create a popular social movement by gathering hundreds of 
popular organization leaders. At first, the CUP enjoyed considerable autonomy, which made possible the   
organization of the First March Against Hunger in June 1987. Yet, this relative freedom of action dwindled as 
the parties opposing the regime gathered around a strategy aiming to beat Pinochet in the upcoming 
referendum. Tensions between parties and the nascent popular movement reached a peak when CUP leaders 
disobeyed the former by organizing a Second March Against Hunger. As one of the original leaders explained, 
« The political parties removed all of the leaders of the CUP in June-July [1988]. Political leaders [more loyal to 
their parties] were put in their place. The logic of the operation was that of the Command for the No ... The 
social organization was disarticulated because it lost its best leaders ... The CUP lasted six months. Out of 40 
leaders, only [one] remained » (cited in Oxhorn, 1994a, p.59. Italics added). 
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context and institutions, which can be more or less favourable to the emergence of collective 
initiatives. The analysis of the influence of this factor is made possible by a popular economy 
analytical framework and confirmed by a wide range of research, which shows that “state structures 
and institutions, along with the kinds of linkages political parties develop with civil society, are the 
primary determinants of the level and form of popular sector political participation” (Posner, 2004, p. 
58). Various comparative studies focusing on Latin America indicate that popular sector initiatives 
structure their political and economic participation according to the resources and the political 
opportunities available to them (Cornelius, 1974; Goldrich, 1970; Houtzager & Kurtz, 2000; Portes, 
1989).     
 
(b) The individual and the collective: the two extremes of a continuum 
 
The problems that the movement of PEOs was confronted with as well as the current difficulties faced 
by territorial organizations lead us to see the individual and the collective as the two extremes of a 
continuum of field realities rather than as distinct categories. Such a perspective yields a better 
understanding of the hurdles to overcome when setting up collective initiatives. Figure 1 synthetizes 
the elements developed above. While this list is not exhaustive, what it shows is that both internal and 
external factors to organizations can either help or hinder the setting up of collective experiences. 
 


























External factors include the condition of necessity and the influence of political and economic 
institutions. These factors can act either directly on the creation process of PEOs or indirectly through 
the action of internal factors, for example when political institutions affect the collective identity of a 
social group and the degree of trust among actors. 
 
The internal factors comprise the condition of collective identity, which itself includes the level of trust 
among actors, the pragmatic elements of cohesion as well as the degree of leadership.  
 
External factors 
- Condition of necessity 









- Condition of collective identity 
 Level of trust 
- Pragmatic element of cohesion 
- Level of leadership 
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On the spectrum of initiatives, territorial organizations feature between individual initiatives and 
activity-based organizations (i.e. PEOs in the full sense of the term), as the former present a lower 
degree of collective integration than the latter. The place of the various existing initiatives on this 





To conclude, we suggest that current PEOs in Santiago de Chile differ in their functioning from the 
traditional capitalist firm as theorized by standard economic theories in various respects. We have 
shown that accumulation or growth is not their unique objective. This embraces some aspects related 
to the “enlarged reproduction of life” as theorized by Coraggio (1999, 2006), which are notably 
reflected by explicit objectives as expressed by the organizations themselves, the absence of sustained 
growth trend among activity-based activities and the presence of extra-economic activities and the 
diversification of sources of income. The beneficiary category is constituted by the members, their 
families and, in some cases, by local community members. Moreover, as regards the dominant 
category, the conducted research highlights the existence of participative and democratic processes, 
which are not based on capital ownership. These elements bear testimony to the social and political 
dimensions of these organizations, despite the relative weakening of such dimensions within more 
recent groups. 
 
Our observations also reveal a deep change that took place over the last twenty years, which is 
materialized by the differences between the various generations of PEOs, especially from the point-of-
view of their political dimensions and their external supports, and between activity-based and 
territorial organizations. Our analysis of the historical context also highlights a sharp decrease in the 
number of PEOs. The cause of the decline of the popular movement is to be found in its evolving 
relations with the political elites opposing the dictatorship. Indeed, we have seen that the cohesive 
reference represented by the identity of poblador started eroding under the effect of events occurring 
before the democratic transition. The pursuit, for almost forty years, of neoliberal policies favoring the 
coordination of economic decisions by the market also partly explains this change. 
 
Therefore, it seems necessary to adapt the theoretical approach to the Chilean popular economy as it 
was formulated during the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s (Nyssens, 1997; Razeto, 1991, 
1993). Indeed, our research data emphasizes the need to take into account the current realities of 
collective dynamics within popular sectors. This is why we suggest looking upon individual and 
collective dynamics as the two extremes of a continuum rather than as distinct categories. Such a 
conceptualization makes it possible to highlight the various factors, both internal–the condition of 
identity, including the level of trust, pragmatic elements of cohesion, and the level of leadership–and 
external–political and economic institutions, and the condition of necessity–that hinder or, on the 
contrary, stimulate the creation of collective initiatives within the popular economy. We hope that this 
proposal may contribute to a closer understanding of the challenges facing popular sectors in their 
attempt to build collective action, and pave the way to public policies supporting their efforts.   
  
 




Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for "lemons": quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500.  
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization. 
American Economic Review, 62(5), 777-795.  
Allan San Juan, P., & Reinecke, G. (2006). La aplicación de la Ley de Microempresas Familiares a 
nivel local. In M. E. Valenzuela, R. Di Meglio & G. Reinecke (Eds.), De la casa a la formalidad. 
Experiencias de la Ley de Microempresas Familiares en Chile Santiago. Santiago du Chili: 
OIT. 
Álvarez, R., & Claro, S. (2009). David Versus Goliath: The Impact of Chinese Competition on 
Developing Countries. World Development, 37(3), 560-571.  
Álvarez, R., & Opazo, L. (2011). Effects of Chinese Imports on Relative Wages: Microevidence from 
Chile. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113(2), 342-363.  
Angell. (1989). Trade Unions in Chile in the 1980s. Paper presented at the Conference 
"Transformation and Transition in Chile, 1982-1989", University of California, San Diego. 
Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2007). The Economic Lives of the Poor. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
21(1), 141-167. doi: 10.1257/jep.21.1.141 
Bauwens, T. (2012). Une approche substantive des organisations économiques populaires : le cas de 
Santiago du Chili. (Master thesis in economics), Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-La-
Neuve.   
Benería, L. (1995). Toward a greater integration of gender in economics. World Development, 
23(11), 1839-1850.  
Bresnahan, R. (2003). Chile Since 1990: The Contradictions of Neoliberal Democratization. Latin 
American Perspectives, 30(5), 3-15.  
Contreras, D., de Mello, L. & Puented, E. (2008). Tackling Business and Labour Informality in Chile. 
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 607. 
Coraggio, J. L. (1999). Políticas sociales y economía del trabajo. Alternativa a las políticas 
neoliberales para la ciudad. Madrid: Miño y Dávila Editores. 
Coraggio, J. L. (2006). Economie du travail. In J.-L. Laville & A. D. Cattani (Eds.), Dictionnaire de 
l’autre économie (pp. 313-325). Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. 
Coriat, B., & Weinstein, O. (1995). Les nouvelles théories de l’entreprise. Paris: Livre de Poche, 
Collection Références. 
Cornelius, W. A. (1974). Urbanization and Political Demand Making: Political Participation Among 
the Migrant Poor in Latin American Cities. The American Political Science Review, 68(3), 
1125-1146.  
Defourny, J., & Develtere, P. (2000). The social economy : the worldwide making of a third sector. In 
J. Defourny, P. Develtere & B. Fonteneau (Eds.), Social economy in North and South (pp. 17-
47 ). Liège/Leuven: HIVA/Centre d'Économie Sociale-ULg. 
Donovan, P., & Gonzalez, R. (2004). Économie populaire, sociale et solidaire au Chili (1980-2003). 
In CRDC (Ed.), Cahiers de la CRDC, Série Comparaisons Internationales Université du Québec 
en Outaouais. 
DOS (1990). Estrategia de participación para la transición a la democracia. Santiago de Chile. 
Elson, D. (1999). Labor Markets as Gendered Institutions: Equality, Efficiency and Empowerment 
Issues. World Development, 27(3), 611-627.  
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building Theories from Case Study Research. The Academy of Management 
Review, 14(4), 532-550. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007). Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities and 
Challenges. The Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 25-32. 
Eymard-Duvernay, F. (2004). Economie politique de l’entreprise. Paris: La Découverte.  
Favereau, O. (2006). Objets de gestion et objet de la théorie économique. Revue française de 
gestion, 160, 67-79. 
 
Interuniversity Attraction Pole (IAP) on social enterprise (SOCENT) – 2012-2017 
www.iap-socent.be 
Flick, U. (2006). Analytic induction. In V. Jupp (Ed.), The SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods 
(pp. 4-5). London: SAGE Publications. 
Flick, U. (2009). An Introduction to Qualitative Research. London: Sage Publications. 
Fonteneau, B., Nyssens, M. & Salam Fall, A. 1999. 'Le secteur informel: creuset de pratiques 
d’économie solidaire.' In J. Defourny, P. Develtere & B. Fonteneau (Eds.) L’économie sociale 
au Nord et au Sud (pp. 159-78). Brussels : De Boeck Université. 
Ffrench-Davis, R. (2008). Chile entre el neoliberalismo y el crecimiento con equidad : reformas y 
políticas económicas desde 1973 (t. edition Ed.). Santiago: J.C.Sáez Editor. 
Garretón, M. A. (2001). Popular Mobilization and the Military Regime in Chile: The Complexities of 
the Invisible Transition. In S. Eckstein (Ed.), Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social 
Movements. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Gomez, G. M. (2008). Do micro-enterprises promote equity or growth? La Haye: Woord en Daad. 
Goldrich, D. (1970). Political Organization and the Politicization of the Poblador. Comparative 
Political Studies, 3(2), 176-202. 
Granovetter, M. (2000). Le marché autrement: Les réseaux dans l’économie. Paris: Desclée de 
Brouwer, Sociologie économique. 
Gui, B. (1991). The Economic Rationale For The 'Third Sector': Nonprofit and other Noncapitalist 
Organizations. Annals of Public & Cooperative Economics, 62(4), 551-572.  
Hammersley, M. (2006). Theoretical sampling. In V. Jupp (Ed.), The SAGE Dictionary of Social 
Research Methods (pp. 298-299). London: SAGE Publications. 
Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 
Heintz, J. (2009). Employment, Poverty, and Economic Policy in the Context of Widespread Informality, 
Employment Sector. Employment Sector Working Papers. Working Paper. ILO. Geneva.  
Hillenkamp, I. (2009). L’approche latino-américaine de l’économie populaire, les inégalités et la 
pauvreté. Revue de la Régulation [On line serial], 6. http://regulation.revues.org/7625. 
Accessed 14 January 2014. 
Houtzager, P. P., & Kurtz, M. J. (2000). The Institutional Roots of Popular Mobilization: State 
Transformation and Rural Politics in Brazil and Chile, 1960-1995. Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 42(2), 394-424.  
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, October, 305-360. 
Kubal, M. R. (2006). Contradictions and Constraints in Chile's Health Care and Education 
Decentralization. Latin American Politics and Society, 48(4), 105-135. 
Laban, R., & Larrain, F. (1995). Continuity, Change, and the Political Economy of Transition in Chile. 
In R. Dornbusch & S. Edwards (Eds.), Reform, recovery, and growth: Latin America and the 
Middle East (pp. 115-148). Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press. 
Lautier, B. (2004). L’économie informelle dans le tiers monde. Paris : La Découverte. 
Lemaître, A. (2009a). Organisations d’économie sociale et solidaire. Lecture de réalités Nord et Sud à 
travers l’encastrement politique et une approche plurielle de l’économie. (Doctorat en Sciences 
Sociales). Louvain-la-Neuve : Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers & Université 
Catholique de Louvain.  
Lemaître, A. (2009b). Des théories des organisations au concept d’encastrement. In J.-L. Laville & P. 
Glémain (Eds.), L’économie sociale et solidaire aux prises avec la gestion (pp. 295-351). 
Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. 
Lemaître, A., & Helmsing, A. H. J. (2012). Solidarity economy in brazil: movement, discourse and 
practice analysis through a polanyian understanding of the economy. Journal of International 
Development, 24(6), 745-762.  
Manning, P. K. (1982). Analytic induction. In R. B. Smith & P. K. Manning (Eds.), Handbook of Social 
Science Methods: Qualitative Methods (Vol. 11). Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. 
Martínez, J., & Tironi, E. (1985). Las Clases Sociales En Chile: Cambio Y Estratificación, 1970-1980. 
Santiago: Ediciones SUR. 
Maloney, W. F. (2004). Informality Revisited. World Development, 32(7), 1159-1178.  
Meller, P. (1992). La apertura comercial chilena: lecciones de política. Collección Estudios CIEPLAN, 
35, 9-54.  
 
Interuniversity Attraction Pole (IAP) on social enterprise (SOCENT) – 2012-2017 
www.iap-socent.be 
Meller, P. (2007). Un siglo de economía política chilena (1890-1990). Santiago: Andrés Bello. 
MIDEPLAN. (2009). Encuesta CASEN 2009.   
http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/casen_obj.php/ 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Nyssens, M. (1997). Popular economy in the south, third sector in the north: are they signs of a 
germinating economy of solidarity? Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 68(2), 171-
200.  
Nyssens, M., & Van der Linden, B. (2000). Embeddedness, cooperation and popular-economy firms 
in the informal sector. Journal of Development Economics, 61(1), 175-204. 
Olavarría, M. (2003). Protected Neoliberalism: Perverse Institutionalization and the Crisis of 
Representation in Postdictatorship Chile. Latin American Perspectives, 30(6), 10-38.  
Oxhorn, P. (1994a). Understanding Political Change After Authoritarian Rule: The Popular Sectors 
and Chile's New Democratic Regime. Journal of Latin American Studies, 26(3), 737-759. 
Oxhorn, P. (1994b). Where Did All the Protesters Go?: Popular Mobilization and the Transition to 
Democracy in Chile. Latin American Perspectives, 21(3), 49-68. 
Oxhorn, P. (1995). Organizing Civil Society. The Popular Sectors And The Struggle For Democracy in 
Chile: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Peemans, J.-P. (2002). Le développement des peuples face à la modernisation du monde: essai sur les 
rapports entre l'évolution des théories du développement et les histoires du "développment réel" 
dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle. Louvain-la-Neuve & Paris: Academia-
Bruylant/L’Harmattan. 
Perry, G. E., Maloney, W. F. & Omar, O. S. (2007), Informality: Exit and Exclusion. Washington DC: 
The World Bank. 
Portes, A. (1989). Latin American Urbanization during the Years of the Crisis. Latin American 
Research Review, 24(3), 7-44.  
Posner, P. W. (1999). Popular Representation and Political Dissatisfaction in Chile's New Democracy. 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 41(1), 59-85.  
Posner, P. W. (2004). Local Democracy and the Transformation of Popular Participation in Chile. 
Latin American Politics and Society, 46(3), 55-81. 
Razeto, L. (1990). Las Organizaciones Económicas Populares 1973 – 1990. Santiago de Chile: 
Programa de Economía del Trabajo (PET). 
Razeto, L. (1991). Empresas de Trabajadores y Economía de mercado. Santiago de Chile: Programa 
de Economia del Trabajo (PET). 
Razeto, L. (1993). De la Economía Popular a la Economía de Solidaridad en un proyecto de desarrollo 
alternativo. Santiago de Chile: Programa de Economia del Trabajo (PET). 
Romá Martí, M. (2010). Estudio De Caracterización De Las Redes e Instituciones Del Sector De La 
Economía Solidaria: Fundación AVINA. 
Sarria Icaza, A. M., & Tiriba, L. (2005). Economie populaire. In J.-L. Laville & A. D. Cattani (Eds.), 
Dictionnaire de l’autre économie (pp. 217-224). Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. 
Sen, G. (1996). Gender, markets and states: A selective review and research agenda. World 
Development, 24(5), 821-829. 
Servicio Electoral República de Chile (1997). Escrutinos elecciones municipales 1996. Santiago. 
Servicio Electoral República de Chile (2001). Escrutinos elecciones municipales 2000. Santiago. 
Silva, E. (1995). The Political Economy Of Chile's Regime Transition: From Radical To "Pragmatic" 
Neo-Liberal Policies. In P. W. Drake & I. Jaksic (Eds.), The Struggle For Democracy In Chile 
(pp. 98-127). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications: a study in the 
economics of internal organization. New York: Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism: firms, markets, relational 
contracting. New York: Free Press 
Yáñez, J. H., & Letelier, L. S. (1995). Chile. In R. Lopéz Murphy (Ed.), Fiscal Decentralization in Latin 
America. Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank. 
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research : design and methods. London: SAGE Publications. 
